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____________
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____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMAS DAY CARE CENTER CORP., INC.,
Appellant
               
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-06010)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 20, 2005
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, VAN ANTWERPEN and 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 21, 2005)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only the relevant facts.  The
United States sought to reduce to judgment tax, penalty and interest assessments against
Appellant Jamas Daycare Center Corp., Inc. (“Jamas”).  Among these assessments were
employment (FICA) and unemployment (FUTA) taxes, as well as penalties and interest, 
for various time periods between 1988 and 2003.  The United States claims that Jamas
had a total indebtedness with respect to these assessed liabilities in the amount of
$534,217.96, including payments and credits that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
applied to reduce the balances due.  Jamas, however, claimed that it paid $127,992.06
towards its total indebtedness and the IRS failed to properly credit those payments.
The United States filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit
of T. Corcoran, Manager, Technical Services Advisory, and the Declaration of Lawrence
Blaskopf with certificates of assessments and payments (Forms 4340) attached.  Jamas
opposed the motion on the ground that the assessment amount should be reduced, and
supported his argument with an affidavit of Richard Costa, CPA, along with summary
sheets that tallied copies of money orders and checks totaling $127,992.06.  Jamas argued
that there was a reasonable dispute as to whether the IRS had properly credited all such
payments to the tax periods at issue.  The government responded with a declaration of
Joseph Martone, which accounted for all the payments that Jamas claimed were not
3properly credited.  The District Court granted summary judgment and Jamas timely
appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 & 1345.  This Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary
review of an appeal from a grant of summary judgment and apply the same test the
District Court should have used initially, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.  Olson v. GE Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
By virtue of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2005).  “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”  Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “In order to demonstrate the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must supply sufficient evidence (not mere
allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.” Olson, 101 F.3d at 951
(citing Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148
     Actually, the government stated that five checks, nos. 1685, 1967, 1611, 1663 and1
1671, were either made out to a Mr. Williams, or cash, and that one check was returned
unpaid.  Again, Jamas does not dispute the government’s contention.  Given that Jamas
has presented no documentary or testamentary evidence that those checks in dispute
represented funds paid to the government, we cannot credit those checks as evidence of
payment.  Olson, 101 F.3d at 951 (explaining that nonmovant must supply sufficient
evidence – not mere allegations – for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.).
4
(3d Cir. 1993)).
Here, the United States submitted affidavits with certificates of assessments
detailing the taxes, penalties and interest owed by Jamas.  “Assessments are presumed to
be valid, and establish a prima facie case of liability against a taxpayer.”  United States v.
Green, 201 F.3d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Freck v. IRS, 37 F.3d 986, 992 (3d Cir.
1994).  Jamas responded with an affidavit of its own, and evidence of payments made by
Jamas to the government.  
In general, the United States does not dispute that Jamas made those payments to
the government.   However, it offered further evidence that those payments were credited1
to Jamas and explained that the payments did not have any bearing upon Jamas’s total
assessment.  Jamas does not dispute the government’s explanation, nor does it offer any
evidence that these payments were not credited in the manner suggested. Consequently,
even drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Jamas’s allegations that payments
were not properly credited amount to nothing more than mere speculation, and are
insufficient to warrant a trial.  Sterling Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Mortgage Corner, 97 F.3d 39,
45 (3d Cir. 1996).  The Order of the District Court is affirmed.
